A pair of multi-objective programming problems is shown to be symmetric dual by associating a vector-valued infinite game to the given pair. This symmetric dual pair seems to be more general than those studied in the literature.
Introduction
Dorn [6] introduced symmetric duality in nonlinear programming by denning a program and its dual to be symmetric if the dual of the dual is the original problem. In the past, the symmetric duality has been studied extensively in the literature, notably by Dantzig et al. [5] , Mond [7] and Mond and Weir [9] .
Recently, Weir and Mond [13] studied symmetric duality in the context of multi-objective programming by introducing a multi-objective analogue of the primal-dual pair presented in Mond [8] . Although the multi-objective primaldual pair constructed in [13] subsumes the single objective symmetric duality [7] as a special case, the construction of [13] seems to be somewhat restricted because the same parameter A. e R p (vector multiplier corresponding to various objectives) is present in both primal and dual. Further, the proof of the main duality result in [13] assumes this k to be fixed in the dual problem.
The main aim of this paper is to present a pair of multi-objective programming problems (P) and (D) with A. as variable in both programs and to establish symmetric duality by associating a vector-valued infinite game to this pair. [2] Symmetric duality in multi-objective programming 199
Although this construction seems to be more natural than that of [13] as it does not require X to be fixed in the dual problem, it lacks the weak duality theorem as illustrated in Section 3. However, the case of single objective symmetric duality [7] is fully subsumed here as well, because (P) and (D) then reduce to the primal-dual pair of Dantzig et al. [5] .
Preliminaries and statement of problems
Let R" be an n -dimensional Euclidean space and R^ be its non-negative orthant. For z, w e R", by z = w we mean z, = u>, for all /, and z < w means z, = wi for all / and z s > w s for at least one s, I = s -n. By z < w,v/e mean z, < wi for all i. Let e = (1, 1,... 
is the payoff to player I and -K(x, y) is the payoff to player II.
In this representation it is assumed that player I solves the "min-max problem" and player II solves the "max-min problem" in the sense of Definition 3 given below. Also the symbol "V-max" stands for vector maximisation and V-min stands for vector minimisation.
The following definition will be needed in this sequel. DEFINITION 
y°). (iii) K(x, y°) t K(x°, y°)Vx e X and K(x°, y) £ K(x°, y°)Vy e Y
We now state the following two multi-objective programming problems (P) and (D) and establish the main duality theorem in Section 3:
Here 
Vector-valued infinite game and multi-objective programming
Corresponding to the multi-objective programming problems (P) and (D) as defined above, we introduce the vector-valued infinite game VG : {S, T, K], where (i) 5 = [x e R m : x = 0} is the strategy space for player I,
(ii) T -{y € R" : y = 0} is the strategy space for player II and (iii) K : SxT -* R" defined by K(x, y), is the payoff to player I. The payoff to player II will be taken as -K(x, y).
The theorems given below give necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair (x, y) e 5 x T to be an equilibrium point of the game VG. PROOF. Since (x, y) is an equilibrium point of the game VG, it follows that
and K{x,y)tK{x,y) VyeT.
Now (5) implies that JC is an efficient solution of the following problem:
Hence there exists (Singh [11] ) n 0 e R+, /x 0 # 0 such that be not efficient to (P); then there exists 0c 0 , yo, n) which is feasible for (P) such that 
. , p, K, be concave-convex. Then (x, y) is an equilibrium point of the game VG.
PROOF. We have to prove that
K(x,y)£K{x,y) Vx e 5, K(x, y) t K(x, y)
V;y e T.
If possible, let K{x, y) < K(x, y) for some x € S. Therefore p7K(x, y) < p7K(x, y). Now by the concavity of j!
But (3) 
Symmetric duality
In this section, we shall prove a symmetric duality theorem for multi-objective programming problems (P) and (D). In this context, it may be remarked that the traditional weak duality theorem [13] does not hold good for multi-objective programming problems (P) and (D), as illustrated by the following example.
Example: Let 
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0334270000009127
t -y,-n = 0, i = 1,2, . . . , p,
( § , M , y ) = 0.
Since JL > 0, it follows from (14) that y = 0. Hence (11) becomes
where cr = £f =1 ft. (8) and (9) can be rewritten as
Now from (16), (18) and (19), it follows that
By using (17), the above inequality gives Thus the status of symmetric duality in multi-objective programming is not very satisfactory, and it needs to be studied further.
